麻豆蜜桃AV

As the U.S. prepared for a new presidential administration, with a potential breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the prospect of resolving other global tensions on the horizon, two of the nation鈥檚 foremost military and diplomatic leaders shared their insights on what the world might look like in 2025. 

In a recent conversation hosted by 麻豆蜜桃AV World and the Global and National Security Institute and U.S. Marine General (Ret) Frank鈥疢cKenzie, Jr. struck a clear-eyed yet cautiously optimistic tone as they surveyed the security challenges on the global stage, from the military and economic threats posed by China, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war between Israel and Hamas shifting the power balance in the Middle East 鈥� and the connections between all of it.  

Adding to global complexity: the second Trump Administration and its anticipated policy shifts; the relative strength of the NATO Alliance and its future; and American voters鈥� diminished appetite for global engagement amid a strong sentiment that the U.S. should put its own interests first. That鈥檚 been a shift in perspective for the world鈥檚 most powerful nation whose role is lifting and protecting smaller democracies 鈥� a worldview that has largely shaped the post-World War II global order. 

The wide-ranging, hour-long conversation hosted by 麻豆蜜桃AV World Vice President Kiki Caruson with Stephenson, a Florida native who was a career diplomat and is now the Vice Provost for Global Affairs and Chief Global Officer at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and McKenzie, the former U.S. Central Command commander who now is executive director of the GNSI, was held Jan. 16 鈥� just days before President Trump鈥檚 inauguration and hours after news broke of a potential ceasefire in Gaza.

Caruson asked the duo the essential question of the evening: 鈥淗ow would you assess America's standing in the world? What worries you or keeps you up at night? 

Stephenson replied: 鈥淲here I see us is, surprisingly, standing very, very tall and looking quite strong.鈥� She cited the widening gap between the U.S. economy and China鈥檚 in recent years (rather than China鈥檚 economy surpassing the U.S., as was expected before the COVID-19 pandemic) and American investment in its military (still more than the top 10 countries combined) as positive indicators of continued U.S. global strength.  

Other bright spots, she noted, are NATO鈥檚 resolve as an alliance in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the network of alliances the U.S. has forged in the Pacific that have 鈥渂oxed China in.鈥� 

鈥淎nd I want to throw in No. 4 鈥� the lion鈥檚 share of the great research universities in the world,鈥� Stephenson added, citing a fellow diplomat calling higher education the 鈥渟ecret sauce of American success.鈥�  

鈥淚 don't think we should ever underestimate what a competitive advantage it is for us to have these great research universities, not only for the technological edge and economic dynamism, but because we are attracting the world's best talent to our shores with those universities, and we really need to be smart about that,鈥� Stephenson said.  

鈥淚 don't think we should ever underestimate what a competitive advantage it is for us to have these great research universities..." 鈥擲tephenson

鈥淪o, what do I worry about? We're doing too much deficit spending. It really is high when you look at it, it's time to start worrying about that. China is catching up on some of this technological stuff. 鈥� It is crucial that the U.S. remain ahead in AI.鈥� 

鈥淎nd I do sometimes worry about the loss of America's standing when our democracy was such a beacon for the world and powerful moral example. Polling shows that has declined so dramatically and that worries me. That's a big job of work we have to do at home.鈥� 

Calling himself an 鈥渦napologetic internationalist," McKenzie said he agreed that strong alliances make the difference in global security for the U.S. and gives it an advantage over rival nations. 

鈥淐hina does not have that. Russia does not have that. None of our opponents have it,鈥� McKenzie said. 鈥淔or those who say it's difficult working with allies, as Churchill said, it is the most difficult thing possible, except not having allies. 

鈥淚 would argue that that is the unique asymmetric advantage of the United States. Our military is certainly very strong, very capable. But our military is even stronger and more capable when it is paired with partner nations.鈥� 

What worries McKenzie? 

鈥淲hat worries me is the history of the United States says sometimes we turn our back on international engagement,鈥� McKenzie responded, pointing to after World War I when the U.S. adopted a largely isolationist foreign policy, only to the rise of fascism lead to World War II. 

鈥淲e sometimes turn inward. We reject the leadership role that we have,鈥� he said. 鈥淚 do not believe the defense of the United States begins on the North Carolina coast or the coast of California or in Hawaii. It actually begins much further afield, and you have to be engaged in the world. The resources that this nation has, the geographic position that we occupy, make it very difficult for us to turn our back on the world, and if we do that then we lose that advantage of the alliance structure.鈥� 

Other key points in the conversation: 

McKenzie on U.S. industrial policy and its connection to security: 鈥淭he ammunition locker is very depleted.鈥�  

鈥淲e have a very tissue-thin industrial base that is not actually able to keep up with the demands that we're seeing today. There are demands of resupplying Ukraine and other places and demands of campaigns that we have fought. And it's not just sophisticated stuff. It's what we would call 鈥渄umb鈥� bombs, artillery projectiles, things like that. We no longer have the capability of manufacturing in scale. We were once the arsenal of democracy. We are not today. 

鈥淵ou can鈥檛 build a tank in the United States today. We don鈥檛 have a tank factory anymore 鈥� The Navy has a ship building plan, but they can鈥檛 get the workers to man shipyards. This is a crisis. It鈥檚 a quiet crisis 鈥� until suddenly it鈥檚 not.鈥� 

"I think it is really important in this case, that we stand by Ukraine. I think that's how we keep faith with our allies in Europe." 鈥擲tephenson

Stephenson on the future of the Russia-Ukraine conflict: 鈥淚 think we can see where this ends.鈥� 

鈥淯kraine will not get the Domb氓s and Crimea back. The deal will be to cede those to Russia, at least on some kind of a temporary ceasefire basis. Nobody likes that. We kind of had an agreement that you wouldn't take territory by force. It sticks in the craw to have to do it. I'm not sure the Europeans are going to buy this, but this is kind of where the Americans are. 鈥� I will say what's left of Ukraine, then, when you take off that Russian-speaking component 鈥� is a pretty stable, very pro-Western Ukraine that's left. So, can they join NATO? I don't think so. Can they join the EU? There probably is a path to accession with that and then with a whole lot of bilateral security guarantees for Ukraine. 

鈥溾�� I think it is really important in this case, that we stand by Ukraine. I think that's how we keep faith with our allies in Europe. I think they are looking to us not to abandon Ukraine and to reward this really egregious behavior.鈥� 

McKenzie on Ukraine: 鈥淎n ugly, bloody deadlock鈥� 

鈥淚 would just hope to that is key to that is going to be security guarantees and economic assistance to ensure that Ukraine 鈥� is a viable economic platform and is able to flourish. I see no other way this is going to end.鈥� 

Stephenson on sustained disinformation campaigns: 鈥淭here are things that make us great that we are beginning to doubt.鈥� 

鈥淲e doubt our democracy. We doubt higher education. We doubt the value of all this foreign talent flowing to our shores 鈥� The Russians have got an extraordinary capacity to see where we have doubts and to go into those and make the cleavages so much deeper. Even being aware of it doesn't make you immune.鈥� 

Stephenson on the Middle East and a weaker Iran: 鈥淭here鈥檚 a moment here.鈥� 

鈥淚ran is weak. Hezbollah is not functioning. Hamas is much weaker. There is a really good day-after plan for Gaza 鈥� it doesn鈥檛 have the Israeli Defense Forces or Hamas running Gaza for a while. It has a multinational force that goes in, and you get aid provided and you get the place stabilized and then you do need to figure out at some point what the hell is the political solution to this. We can鈥檛 just go on doing this tactically.鈥� 

McKenzie on what鈥檚 next for Palestinians: 鈥淵ou got to come up with some way for people in the West Bank and in Gaza to have a hope of living otherwise you are going to fight them forever.鈥� 

鈥淎nd I don鈥檛 think anybody, except Hamas, ultimately wants that to be the outcome. Hamas can鈥檛 be part of the solution, but there are Arab states that can fund the solution and there are Arab states that can provide troops for this solution 鈥� and they are not necessarily the same states that would do that. I can see a path forward here.鈥� 

Stephenson on China: 鈥淚t is really a force to be reckoned with.鈥�   

鈥淓ven though it鈥檚 hit serious economic headwinds, its growth has slowed from 10% a year for years sustained in which they lifted 800 million people out of poverty, the biggest achievement like that in the history of the world 鈥� It鈥檚 got a declining population, so we are talking about slowing growth we are talking about a population that is smaller each year. And it鈥檚 smaller fast, it鈥檚 remarkable how much smaller China looks at the end of 100 years from now. 

鈥溾�� They鈥檝e got real capability in the technology space, and they鈥檝e been making things all these years when we have not been making things 鈥� They are putting a whole lot of people and money into developing a superiority in AI and machine learning and quantum computing. 

鈥溾�� There are things we鈥檙e certain about, like we are going to out-innovate them, that I used to be sure about and I am not sure about at all anymore.鈥�